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On Prometheus’ Legacy: 
H. Patrick Glenn’s Pluralist Logics, Enzo Melandri’s Analogy,
and Legal Plurality’s ‘Ontological Register’ 
LUCA SILIQUINI-CINELLI 
Abstract: Over the past few years, legal theorists and socio-legal scholars have increasingly 
been advocating the formation of a pluralist jurisprudence capable of efficiently identifying 
and operationalising current regulative phenomena beyond and within state-based constructs. 
The cosmopolitan rethinking of legal thought centred on the emergence of non-classical, 
paraconsistent logics promoted by the late leading comparatist H. Patrick Glenn has become a 
key-theme of these new meta-theoretical reflections. Starting from this premise, this article 
explores Glenn’s call for logical pluralism in (comparative) legal studies through the lens of 
the Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri’s reflections on what distinguishes the rationality of 
classical and paraconsistent logics from that of analogical reasoning. The aim is to show that a 
contextualisation of Glenn’s thought from the perspective of Melandri’s philosophy confirms 
how because of their inner rationality and cognitivist purpose, neither classical nor 
paraconsistent logics can act as a gateway to legal plurality’s facticity. Instead, as plurality is a 
matter of factical experience rather than reason and knowledge (and thus, analytical 
reconstructions), what is required is a factical, experiential thinking capable of accommodating 
the facticity of otherness as (cultural) diversity and alterity in the legal dimension. 
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Logical abstraction is also sociological abstraction1 
Once an experience has become measurable and certain, it immediately loses its authority2  
[M]eaning is not a conceptually or inferentially structured “logical space”  
that can only be rationally reconstructed3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, legal theorists and socio-legal scholars have increasingly been 
advocating the formation of a pluralist jurisprudence capable of efficiently identifying and 
operationalising current regulative phenomena beyond and within state-based constructs. 
While this pluralist wave takes different forms,4 a key-theme of these new meta-theoretical 
reflections is the cosmopolitan rethinking of legal thought centred on the emergence of non-
classical, paraconsistent logics advocated by the leading comparatist H. Patrick Glenn.5 Simply 
put, the term ‘paraconsistent logic’ refers to a ternary form of multivalent and modal logical 
thought that accommodates contradictions. This is done by transcending the binary code (i.e. 
‘either A or ¬A’) upon which the Western tradition has emerged and developed to date. Instead 
of forcing the interpreter to choose between ‘A’ and ‘¬A’ (i.e. ‘B’) according to the laws of 
                                                          
1 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society ([1964] 2002), 
p. 143. 
2 Giorgio Agamben, “An Essay on the Destruction of Experience” in Infancy and History, trans. Liz Heron ([1978] 
2007), p. 20. 
3 Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (2013), p. 30. 
4 Nicole Roughan and Andrew Halpin, “The Promises and Pursuits of Pluralist Jurisprudence”, in Nicole Roughan 
and Andrew Halpin (eds.), In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence (2017), p. 326. 
5 See Maksymilian Del Mar, “Legal Reasoning in Pluralist Jurisprudence: the Practice of the Relational 
Imagination” in Roughan and Halpin, note 4 above, p. 40.  
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non-contradiction and the excluded middle,6 paraconsistent logics make room for various tertia 
comparationis that under the exclusionary razor of binary thinking would not find 
accommodation. There is, in other words, a ‘C’ – that is, a third (and, thus, multiple) way(s) to 
coherently and validly reason which, depending on the context of reference, allows us to hold 
views that what would otherwise be deemed illogical, or logically impossible. The thinking 
and use of such ‘tolerant’ logics, Glenn maintained, is simply inevitable if we are to appreciate 
legal traditions’ and legal orders’ inner pluralist dynamics and structural interactions in an age, 
such as ours, characterised by increasing regulatory density, complexity, and uncertainty. 
Unsurprisingly, Glenn’s call for logical pluralism in (comparative) legal studies has generated 
a considerable amount of interest. This articles aims to contribute to the academic debate on 
the subject by offering a never-attempted contextualisation of Glenn’s thought from the 
perspective of the Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri’s reflections on what distinguishes the 
rationality of logical thinking (including its pluralist variants) from that of its analogical 
counterpart. It shows that a contextualisation of Glenn’s views through the lens of Melandri’s 
philosophy confirms how because of their inner rationality and cognitivist purpose, neither 
classical nor paraconsistent logics can act as a gateway to legal plurality’s facticity. More 
specifically, I argue: (A) that underpinning Glenn’s argument there lies a philosophical 
interrogative regarding the nature and meaning of plurality and their appreciation; (A1) that 
this interrogative concerns what Andrew Benjamin has described as the ontological 
irreducibility of plurality, that is, its original, relational alterity and how the latter is 
phenomenologically encountered; (B) that the ternary forms of logical pluralism envisaged by 
Glenn are ultimately unable to accommodate plurality within juridical discourse and thus, 
assisting pluralist jurisprudence’s cause; (C) that this applies to analogical reasoning as well; 
because (D), as is the case with classical logic, the operativity of pluralist logics and analogical 
approaches to phenomena is dependent upon reason’s metaphysical constructivism and 
knowledge’s transcendentalism as originating from the Promethean myth; (E) that appreciating 
the facticity of plurality, including legal plurality, requires moving beyond Husserlian and 
Heideggerian phenomenology and (E1) embarking upon an other-regarding and meaning-
revealing act of lived experience (i.e. experience as Erlebnis, freed from epistemic ambitions 
and as opposed to Erfahrung and knowledge) capable of letting regulatory dynamics appear as 
                                                          
6 But see Priest Graham, Koji Tanaka, and Zach Weber, “Paraconsistent Logics”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/ (accessed 19 June 2019), who specify that 
“many paraconsistent logics do validate the Law of Non-Contradiction…, ⊨¬(A∧¬A), even though they 
invalidate [the argument ex contradictione quodlibet that A, ¬A⊨B]”. 
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relational encounters. These claims are substantiated through a contextualisation of the role 
that the ‘experience-knowledge’ dichotomy as well as logic, analogy, and conceptual thinking 
play within legal discourse, including comparative legal studies. 
As will be seen, since its inception, Western philosophical thinking has never stopped 
concerning itself with the causes of the existence of the manifold and the related issue of the 
orderability of particulars (to which philosophers oppose universals or similar constructs, such 
as concepts).7 The possibility, trajectories, and outcomes of these sorts of inquiries depend on 
our ability to make sense of the world. This is why meaning exerts a normative, guiding 
function. The normative role played by the ontological notions of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ 
(that is, what it means for someone/something to be her/itself and therefore, not 
someone/something else) – both of which, not coincidentally, feature at the centre of Glenn’s 
work – has been a key-theme of this type of questioning on what constitutes (that is, on how 
we can make sense of) the real. Things have not changed to date: “the making sense relation is 
the basic normative relation”,8 as David Owens recently observed using terminology that 
directly emphasises the performative role that ‘meaning’ plays in the normative encounter 
between subject and object. Drawing from the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger, Steven Crowell has stressed the inherently phenomenological character of the 
normative, ordering process: “phenomenology… break[s] decisively with mentalism and 
representationalism and explore[s] meaning as encountered directly in our practical and 
perceptual life”.9 In other words, being a practice,10 phenomenological inquiry aims to reach 
the ‘whatness’ of beings by focusing on their ‘howness’ as phenomena, i.e. as relational 
encounters between subject and object. In so doing, phenomenology shows that the ‘whatness’ 
interrogative is structurally related to how “something as something”11 reveals itself.12 
Phenomenology, then, challenges the metaphysical tradition of subjectivism and holds that 
whichever meaning is generated through the relational encounter is not the result of some 
                                                          
7 In 1935, more than two millennia after the spring of philosophy, Martin Heidegger commenced his lecture course 
on metaphysics at the University of Freiburg by asking “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”. In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt ([1957] 2014), p. 1. See also Etiénne 
Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience. The Medieval Experiment, the Cartesian Experiment, the Modern 
Experiment ([1934] 1967), ch 12. 
8 David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (2012), p. 12. Emphasis added. 
9 Crowell, note 3 above, p. 34. 
10 Roberta De Monticelli, Il Dono dei Vincoli. Per Leggere Husserl (2018) 7. All translations are mine. 
11 Crowell, note 3 above, p. 16. Emphasis in original. 
12 Ibid., p. 19. 
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individual positing. Rather, it is the result of what could not have been otherwise – hence 
meaning’s guiding-role in life, or normativity. 
The normative properties that characterise the phenomenological process’ relational dynamics 
exert their guiding function not only when we encounter an object (such as a pen, a car, a tree, 
a legal norm, or even an argument13), but also when we encounter another subject (that is, a 
person). This is why the relationally-charged phenomenological reading of plurality has been 
recently placed at the centre of philosophical evaluations of social and political coexistence as 
well.14 If that is the case, it can be safely argued that legal plurality too is governed by the same 
relational, phenomenological dynamism as it too is an expression of the relational phenomenon 
that is plurality.15 This simply means that, as I aim to show, legal plurality16 also requires “a 
phenomenological articulation of existential issues”,17 following Sophie Loidolt.  
The question, however, is which phenomenological route the interpreter ought to embark upon 
given the variety of accounts in phenomenological discourse. The answer I offer with this 
article is that what is needed is a phenomenological thinking that embraces plurality for what 
it is—i.e. a matter of factical experience, rather than knowledge and reason. As already 
mentioned and will be further set out in due course, this means departing from both Husserlian 
and Heideggerian phenomenology. This is why the term ‘ontological register’ is of the essence 
for what follows. The term is borrowed from Andrew Benjamin’s seminal work on the 
ontological irreducibility of plurality as original relational alterity.18 Benjamin argues for the 
“necessity to think the relational”19 from unexplored viewpoints, which allows the interpreter 
to appreciate its “original presence”.20 Original here means always ontologically given and 
irreducible: “a particular is given, and always given, within relations”,21 Benjamin writes. 
                                                          
13 Reinar Forst, Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification, trans. Ciaran Cronin ([2015] 
2017), p. 74. 
14 Thomas Szanto, Dermot Moran (eds.), Phenomenology of Sociality. Discovering the ‘We’ (2015); Sophie 
Loidolt, Phenomenology of Plurality. Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity (2017). 
15 Cf. Alexander Somek, The Legal Relation: Legal Theory after Legal Positivism (2017), p. 20; Ugo Mattei, 
“Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems”, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, XLV (1997), pp. 5, 19. 
16 My choice of the term ‘legal plurality’ is not causal as one of my main aims is to avoid discussing alterity via 
recourse to analytical elaborations, such as that of ‘legal pluralism(s)’. On the latter’s self-referential meanings, 
see Jaakko Husa, “The Truth is Out There? Legal Pluralism and the Language-Game”, in Séan Patrick Donlan 
and Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (eds.), Concepts of Law: Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science 
Perspectives (2014), p. 75. 
17 Loidolt, note 14 above, p. 20. 
18 Andrew Benjamin, Towards a Relational Ontology: Philosophy's Other Possibility (2015), p. 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 6. 
20 Ibid., p. 2. 
21 Ibid., p. 19. Emphases added. 
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Singularities can only be (and, thus, be experienced) as an “after-affect”22 of the “constituting 
plural event”.23 In other words, 
The plural event is that which allows for singularities… [T]he term has a double 
ontological register. In the first instance, that register identifies the presence of a 
founding ontological irreducibility. Secondly and consequently, that register marks 
the place of a founding set-up that needs to be explicated in terms of relational 
ontology precisely because it is the site of already present and irreducible 
relations… Irreducibility is an essential part of relationality… If a relation is 
original, then there cannot be any element of the relation that precedes it.24 
From this it follows that “[p]lurality’s originality can no longer be thought in terms of a reductio 
ad unam”.25 Thus, Benjamin’s mode of experiencing reality as irreducible relational alterity 
deactivates the very ontological impasse that characterises the Western tradition’s approach to 
what distinguishes the universal from the particular.26 This theme is of pivotal importance for 
my argument as it is directly related to how identities and differences are experienced (i.e. how 
the meaning of what they are is phenomenologically generated). More specifically, its 
relevance for the scope of this article is due to the fact that it makes room for a form of 
phenomenological, relational thinking capable of overcoming the inconsistency of the two 
opposing views that philosophy has divided itself into since its inception: that which decodes 
reality through processes of individualisation, and that which sees it as an “abstract 
universality”.27  What has gone missing in all of this is that plurality does not have an “essential 
nature”.28 Hence “the relationship between universal and particular is not the way original 
relationality is to be understood”.29 Rather, “[r]elationality describes a state of affairs that is 
ontological. It is not just that being is relational but that what exists fundamentally is a 
relation”.30 Asserting that relationality has no essence simply means holding that “[w]hile 
relationality is ubiquitous, there is no one determined form of relationality. On the contrary, 
singulars are always already in relation such that singularities are the after-effect of 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 3. 
25 Ibid., p. 4. 
26 Ibid., p. 11. 






relationality”.31 Accordingly, “[s]ingularites, and thus particulars, do not have an abstract 
quality such that all singulars are defined in terms of an excluding and exclusive form of 
abstraction…”.32  
Starting from this premise – and sharing Andrei Marmor’s argument on the need for more 
philosophical investigations into law’s ontological status33 – the following pages show that for 
jurisprudence to be fully pluralist, it needs to abandon the epistemic search for truth and 
correctness34 that has kept it increasingly busy since Rome’s revolutionary ontological 
abstraction of phenomena and predominantly throughout modernity. Rather, jurisprudence will 
have to concern itself with the ontological irreducibility of factical existence’s meaningful 
relationality. This is all the more relevant if we think of law as a series of shared normative 
experiences.35 To say that jurisprudence has to be sensitive to context – an argument that has 
been increasingly made since William Twining’s landmark work on the subject36 – is certainly 
an important part of this pluralist effort. Yet this is not enough: as anticipated above, 
appreciating (legal) plurality’s facticity ultimately requires embarking upon an other-regarding 
and meaning-revealing act of lived experience (Erlebnis) capable of letting regulatory 
dynamics appear as relational encounters. Neither reason’s metaphysical constructivism (as 
epitomised by logical and analogical thinking, and conceptual representationalism), nor 
knowledge (i.e. a metaphysical end-result of processes of ontological abstraction37) can be of 
assistance in this effort. As the Promethean myth reveals, reason’s and knowledge’s immanent 
and transcendental character embraces reality only to overcome it. Rather, appreciating the 
relational nature and meaning of identity and the alterity that defines it requires experiencing 
the facticity of the other as other (i.e. what it phenomenologically means for the other to 
actualise themselves in their ipseity). As plurality is a matter of factical experience rather than 
                                                          
31 Ibid., p. 17. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Andrei Marmor, “What’s Left of General Jurisprudence: On Law’s Ontology and Content”, Jurisprudence, X 
(2019), p. 151. 
34 Some comparative lawyers are aware of this: see Mark van Hoecke “Is There Now a Comparative Law 
Scholarship?”, The Journal of Comparative Law, XII (2017), p. 271. 
35 Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law. Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism ([2009] 2016); Hans 
Lindahl, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion (2018), pp. 35, 37–38. 
36 William Twining, General Jurisprudence. Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (2009). Recently, in 
the comparative law literature, see Jaakko Husa, Advanced Introduction to Law and Globalisation (2018), p. 46; 
Catherine Valcke, Comparing Law. Comparative Law as Reconstruction of Collective Commitments (2018), p. 
97. 
37 Due to restrictions on space, I do not directly discuss the act of ‘cognition’, by which term I mean the act of 
acquiring information/knowledge. I will only make some indirect considerations to the extent that this is required 
for the purposes of my argument. 
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reason and knowledge (and thus, analytical reconstructions), factical thinking is the gateway 
to pluralist thinking not only in general, but also within (comparative) legal discourse. 
This article is divided as follows. Section I sets out the basic thrust of Glenn’s argument on 
cosmopolitan thought and logical pluralism. Section II discusses the aspects of Melandri’s 
complex philosophy on logic, including its non-classical variants, and analogical thinking, 
which are more relevant from the perspective of Glenn’s account. Taking one step further, 
Section III engages with some central and pervasive themes regarding logical and analogical 
thought and conceptual analysis in Western jurisprudence as well as theoretical inquiries in 
pluralist settings more broadly. It then (briefly) explores an experiential thinking capable of 
accommodating the facticity of otherness as (cultural) diversity and alterity in the legal 
dimension. Concluding remarks follow.  
 
GLENN'S COSMOPOLITAN THOUGHT 
What is a Tradition? 
H. Patrick Glenn was a leading legal international comparatist whose seminal works have 
played (and will no doubt continue to play) a fundamental role in shaping the development of 
the theory and practice of comparative law. The success of Glenn’s scholarship (and lectures) 
is not just due to the analytical depth of his reflections regarding such topics as the aims of 
comparative law and the origins and development of legal traditions. Another important reason 
for Glenn’s peculiar appeal is the combination of his inter-disciplinary methodology of inquiry 
and elegant writing style. Legal Traditions of the World,38 arguably Glenn’s most important 
work,39 was deemed important enough for the inaugural issue of The Journal of Comparative 
Law to be dedicated to it. Glenn has also attracted a considerable amount of criticism, most 
notably from such cultural and critical comparative scholars as James Whitman and Pierre 
Legrand.40 The lively debate that Glenn’s claims and methodology of inquiry have generated 
                                                          
38 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (2010). Hereinafter ‘LTW’. 
39 Defined as “path-breaking” by David Nelken, in “Review: The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a 
Theme for the Twenty‐First Century, by Esin Örücü”, Legal Studies, XXVI (2006), p. 129. 
40 See for instance, James Whitman, “A Simple Story”,Rechtsgeschichte, IV (2004), p. 206; Pierre Legrand, 
“Jameses at Play. A Tractation on the Comparisons of Laws”, American Journal of Comparative Law, LXV 
(2017), pp. 1, 14–15. 
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over more than two decades is testament to how influential his work has become within the 
comparative law circle and beyond.41 
It is in LTW’s last chapter that Glenn sets out the need for a form of logical thinking capable 
of appreciating legal traditions’ internal and external plurality. For Glenn, a tradition is an 
entity composed of information.42 Better still, tradition is information. Before moving on to 
explain what sort of information a tradition exactly is, drawing from J.A.G. Pocock, Glenn 
clarifies that “it would be inappropriate to see it… as an indefinite series of repetitions of an 
action”.43 This would lead us to erroneously confuse “the results or impact of the tradition, its 
immediate manifestation, with the tradition itself”.44 This is because “[i]f there is a ‘traditional 
way of doing things’, the tradition is the way, and not in the doing. Acts or decisions, once they 
take place, disappear forever if they are not translated into communicable information”.45 This 
passage will prove to be fundamental for our purposes as it specifically points to the two themes 
that Glenn’s pluralist argument is grounded on: identity and communication. These are 
discussed separately below. 
 
Identity 
The first theme is ontological and concerns the notion of identity46 – a term which, alongside 
that of difference, has defined the very establishment and development of comparative law as 
a discipline. The emphasis I placed on the copula ‘is’ when mentioning, in the previous Section, 
that to Glenn a tradition is information serves to stress the importance of this theme in Glenn’s 
cosmopolitan thinking. Importantly, the notion of identity here refers to both a tradition’s 
identity as information and the social and individual identities traditions construct via external 
information exchange processes and internal pluralist dynamics. 
                                                          
41 A good example is Glenn’s reflections on pluralist thinking and logic, which led to the organisation of an inter-
disciplinary workshop on the subject as well as to the publication of an edited collection of essays. See H. Patrick 
Glenn and Lionel D. Smith (eds.), Law and the New Logics (2017). 
42 Glenn, note 38 above, pp. 13–14. 
43 Ibid. Footnote omitted. See also H. Patrick Glenn, “Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions” in Mark van Hoecke 
(ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (2007), pp. 7, 12: “Tradition may influence what we 
do, but it is that which precedes our actions, as a means of normative influence”. 
44 Ibid., p. 13. 
45 Ibid., pp. 13–14. Emphasis added. 
46 Ibid., pp. 13, 25, and 373. 
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Regarding the former aspect, it is worth noticing that to Glenn, the term ‘tradition’ is different 
from that of ‘system’. This emerges when, in the preface to the first edition of LTW, Glenn 
observes that “tradition… does not appear to be the product of any particular civilization, yet 
appears present, explicitly or implicitly, as a formative influence in the law of all of them”.47 
Legal systems are a different ontological entity whose “history… is clearly and exclusively 
associated with western (and derived Soviet) legal theory”.48 This passage too is particularly 
relevant for our purposes as it indirectly points to another key-element of Glenn’s analysis – 
that legal systems are theoretical constructs whose foundational dynamics are structurally 
related to systemic and thus divisionary and binary thought.49 Glenn writes: 
Theories are rational constructions, which must first answer to requirements of 
internal consistency and logic before they are tested for explanatory power in the 
real world. Theories, and the logic they entail, are part of the tradition of western 
rationalist thought.50 
Glenn makes a similar point with respect to the concept of ‘legal culture’, which he describes 
as a European artefact.51 Traditions escape this constructivist logic. Yet, Glenn further 
specifies, drawing from T.S. Eliot,52 that this does not mean that their formation and survival 
does not require constitutive ‘labour’. By ‘labour’ Glenn means a process of “additional 
cultural significance”53 to the mere existence of a way of doing (or not doing) things.54 While 
such acts of ‘cultural significance’ might take different forms, they share a common core 
revolving around “human support and adherence”55 to the relative practice (such as wearing a 
kilt, as in Glenn’s example).  
This leads us to the second aspect: how traditions make up social and individual identities. 
Here too the focal point of Glenn’s view is how, being information, a tradition’s identity is 
inevitably determined and shaped by external exchanges and internal pluralist dynamics. Thus 
                                                          
47 Ibid., p. xxvii. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
51 See Glenn, note 43 above, p. 11: “The concept of culture exists as a means of differentiation, providing a 
description of difference”. For a critique of Glenn’s view, see Jaakko Husa, “Legal Culture vs. Legal Tradition – 
Different Epistemologies?” Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper 2012/18, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179890 (accessed 19 June 2019). 
52 Glenn, note 38 above, pp. 4–13. 
53 Ibid., p. 5. 
54 See above, Section I. 
55 Glenn, note 38 above, p. 6. 
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we read: “Given any form of contact between traditions, the overall identity of each becomes 
non-exclusive; each contains elements of the other, which may find support in the various 
tendencies in the receiving tradition”.56 This begs the question as “[t]o what extent… is this 
feature of traditions related to collective notions such as society, culture, a legal systems or 
‘ourselves’?”57 Traditions, Glenn asserts, shape social as well as individual identities through 
elaborating and protecting a memory: “[i]n both cases, it is memory which is constitutive of 
identity”.58 After having so claimed, Glenn embarks upon some meaningful considerations 
regarding “two widely used present criteria for social identity: race (or ethnicity) and 
nationality (statehood)”.59  
To discuss Glenn’s views on this latter point would take us beyond the scope of this article. 
Rather, and without anticipating the next Section, what needs to be emphasised is that Glenn’s 
reflections directly tie to the ontological function that the principle of identity (i.e. ‘A = A’) 
has played in the development and promotion of binary thinking in the West. The ‘law of 
identity’ is, indeed, one the three classical laws of logic. This law states that an entity is, and 
cannot but be, the same with itself. Thus, the principle of non-contraction, one of the 
cornerstones of binary thinking, presupposes the law of identity. As will be shown below, 
however, Glenn firmly believes that a rigid interpretation of the notion (and thus, principle) of 
identity is ultimately misleading because it obfuscates the elements of plurality and otherness 
that inevitably form any tradition and shape its development. The opening of thought to non-
binary logics has the precise scope to avoid this reductionist approach to reality and allows us 
to appreciate that alterity always defines identity. 
 
Communication 
The second theme of Glenn’s analysis is the act of communication. Throughout LTW, the 
reader finds multiple references to the significance “human communication”60 has for the 
correct understanding of traditions’ existential dynamics and transformative potential. Indeed, 
the mechanisms through which the information that makes up a tradition is first selected and 
then communicated are constitutive of a tradition’s identity for the simple reason that it is 
                                                          
56 Ibid., p. 35.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 37. 
60 Ibid., p. 7. 
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through communication that information, and thus tradition itself, is passed on to others and 
therefore dynamically preserved. From this it follows that every tradition is an “epistemic 
community”.61 As one might expect, contemporary technological advances considerably 
facilitate these communication processes. However, Glenn observes that it should not be 
thought that epistemic communities are something new, as some have claimed: “If tradition is 
information, and if information is the formative element in all social identities, then the 
adherents to traditions have always constituted epistemic communities”.62 
The main point here is that the information that constitutes a tradition is (and cannot but be) a 
past instance which regenerates (while also adapting) itself through acts of communication, or 
traditio.63 A fundamental dimension of traditions’ emergence, development, and death, Glenn 
tells us, “is found in the necessity of tradition having been continuously transmitted, in a 
particular social context, in order for it to be of current relevance”.64 Hence, “[t]raditio must 
have occurred, and between the relevant parties”.65 Thus traditions are inherently dynamic 
entities. This leads Glenn to consider the meaning-generating practices, or techniques, which 
traditions depend upon. While, as discussed, a tradition is not a theory and thus is not bound to 
constructivist terms and procedures, it cannot do without those “techniques of capture”66 
through which the past is seized, shaped, and transmitted to others: “Absent these… there is 
only the meaningless world of total recall, or oblivion”.67 
Finally, a tradition’s identity and processes of information exchange meet in another zone of 
interaction: commensurability. “Notions of incommensurability are well known in the west and 
are therefore part of western, rational tradition”,68 Glenn notes. Comparatists are very much 
familiar with this theme. According to a leading book on the subject, comparing becomes 
analytically pointless if there are no similarities to be found. 69 The assumption here is that 
common problems require common solutions, no matter what the underlying culture is. To be 
                                                          
61 Ibid., p. 43. 
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63 This also applies to the apparently paradoxically concept of ‘instant traditions’, such as national legal traditions. 
These are not only “possible”, Glenn notes, but they too are “subject to verification of time”: Ibid., p. 6. Again, 
this has to do with the necessity of the tradition’s information being communicated. 
64 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 
65 Ibid., p. 13. 
66 Ibid., p. 7. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 45. 
69 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony Weir ([1977] 1998) 40. 
Zweigert and Kötz’s praesumptio similitudinis has been contested by socio-cultural and critical comparative 




sure, the notion of incommensurability is not “an epistemologically superior position”.70 
However, it has attracted a considerable amount of favour in the past. Incommensurability’s 
success is, of course, not accidental and is directly related to the spread of views that see 
traditions as “static and distinct, whereas in reality they are all composed of variants and even 
contradictions, some of which parallel positions which exist outside the tradition and which are 
known within it”.71 Here lies the structural relationship between tradition, information, identity, 
and communication: 
What the proponents of incommensurability would ultimately have to establish is 
the impossibility of human communication, radical untranslatability, and this is 
denied by all human experience, and possibly by the very idea of being human.72 
Thus, Glenn concludes, “[g]iven the failure of the argument of incommensurability, we are all 
left within communicable traditions”.73 
 
The Value of Logical Pluralism 
Whereas the ‘identity’ theme of Glenn’s analysis is ontological (tradition as identity), the 
‘communication’ theme is epistemological (traditions as epistemic communities). That Glenn 
is correct in approaching the communication element epistemologically emerges when we 
explore it from a purely Platonic point of view – a move which Glenn would have presumably 
agreed with given the role he assigned to Plato’s thought in his considerations. In particular, 
what we should pay attention to is that to Plato, knowledge is, as Gail Fine has shown against 
others, “justified true belief [plus] aitias logismos”74 – that is, “explanation”.75 This simply 
means – crucially – that for Plato, we only have the logos that is required to have knowledge if 
we “have the ability to say, when asked, how x differs from other things”.76 To identify 
something, to know what it is (ontology), we need to able to explain – to communicate 
                                                          




74 Gail Fine, “Introduction” in Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (2008), p. 5. Emphasis in original. 
75 Ibid., p. 116. See also ibid., p. 93. 
76 Ibid., p. 26. Emphases omitted. See also ibid., p. 226: “Knowledge of things, for Plato, is description-
dependent”. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between knowledge of forms (ideas) and knowledge of 
material things (sensibles), see ibid., pp. 8–15, and chs 3 and 4. 
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(epistemology) – why it is different from what it is not. It is thus in the act of communication 
that the ontological meets the epistemological in Plato’s binary approach to life (diaeresis) and 
the resulting laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle.77  
The primary aim of Glenn’s pluralism is to challenge Plato’s binary thinking and replace it 
with non-binary logics. The latter are, in Glenn’s view, a meaningful gateway to tolerant, 
cosmopolitan thought and thus, to a full appreciation of traditions’ internal and external 
plurality. Our ability to deactivate the rigid and exclusionary understanding of reality proper of 
binary thinking requires the opening towards a form of logical reasoning capable of 
transcending the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle upon which classic logic has 
been built and promoted since Plato. In this sense, the value of logical pluralism, according to 
Glenn, lies in its ability not, as might be suggested, to include alterity within the notion of 
identity but rather to reveal that alterity is always already contained in (and thus, defines) 
identity.78  
This is particularly valuable when it comes to assessing major (legal) traditions – i.e. traditions 
that “contain sub-traditions, either purely internal ones or lateral traditions”.79 These traditions, 
Glenn argues, are “epistemologically complex”.80 They “achieve complexity because of their 
proven ability to hold together mutually inconsistent sub-traditions”.81 To this way of operating 
there corresponds a “particular way of thinking… which has been described as multivalent, as 
opposed to bivalent, because sub-traditions are not either right or wrong but might be right in 
different, multiple (inconsistent) ways”.82  
The opening up of thought to cosmopolitan thinking is not only beneficial to assess (legal) 
traditions’ identity, however. It can also assist us in unfolding the “multiplicity of contemporary 
legal orders”.83 As one might expect, considering the legacy of Plato’s epistemology on 
Western thinking, this intellectual effort will take some doing. Moreover, this enterprise is 
                                                          
77 See H Patrick Glenn, “Transnational Legal Thought. Plato, Europe and Beyond” in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo 
Tuori, and Suvi Sankari (eds.), Transnational Law. Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (2014), p. 61, 
where in introducing his critique of Plato, Glenn refers to his thought on “dividing all the world [ontological] and 
its knowledge [epistemological] into two parts, and each of those two parts into two further parts, and so on”. 
78 Bertrand Russell had made a similar point in a lecture aimed at showing inadequacy of the function that the 
“classical tradition” of philosophy had assigned to logic. The passage is not quoted by Glenn. In Our Knowledge 
of the External World ([1914] 2009), p. 6. 
79 Glenn, note 38 above, p. 366. 
80 Ibid., p. 367. 
81 Ibid., p. 368. 
82 Ibid. 
83 H. Patrick Glenn, “Choice of Logic and Choice of Law” in Glenn and Smith, note 41 above, 162–167, p. 165. 
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made particularly difficult by social obstacles too. In a contribution aimed at exploring how 
legal thinking should be re-thought to make room for its transnational variant, Glenn writes 
that “it is possible to rethink thought, in law as in all else, though it is extremely difficult to do 
so successfully with broad effect in society”.84 This is due to the fact that while “[t]here may 
not be inescapable ‘laws of thought’… there are very deeply entrenched social attitudes and 
beliefs about thought, in all society”.85 The very first step to be taken is thus to analyse how 
non-binary thinking operates and what distinguishes it from its binary counterpart. 
Cosmopolitan Thinking and Logics in Law 
To Glenn, cosmopolitan thinking avoids the divisionary, and thus reductionist and ultimately 
misleading, properties of its binary counterpart. It does so to the extent that it accommodates, 
and makes sense of, contradictions and degrees without altering the identity of the subject under 
consideration. It is this very act of “tolerance”, as Glenn calls it in LTW,86 that lets the subject’s 
identity fully appear. Glenn elaborates further on this point in the last chapter of The 
Cosmopolitan State, a fundamental work in comparative legal scholarship and public law 
theory. Glenn’s views (including his methodology of inquiry) ought to be appreciated against 
the book’s thesis that “the state is best seen as the instantiation of legal tradition, and even 
traditions”.87  
Glenn’s analysis on the importance of paraconsistent logics in law TCS commences with a (by 
now rather usual) reference to Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s statement that “the life of the law 
has not been logic, but experience”.88 After having briefly commented on Holmes’ account and 
later, “less categorical”89 views in which “[t]here might be a place for logic in legal 
reasoning”,90 Glenn’s discussion moves on to tracing the origins of Western binary thought 
and the related laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, mentioned earlier.91 Plato, 
Glenn notes, “appears to have been the original source”92 of this divisionary approach to life.  
                                                          
84 Glenn, note 77 above, p. 61. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Glenn, note 38 above, p. 372. See also id., note 77 above, p. 68: “A world of multiple values appears to require 
a multivalent logic tolerant of what might initially appear as contradiction, and necessarily including a middle 
ground”. 
87 H. Patrick Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (2013), p. 259. Hereinafter ‘TCS’. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., p. 260. 
91 See also Glenn, note 77 above. 
92 Glenn, note 87 above, p. 262. 
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Moreover, Glenn aptly observes that “[t]his is probably Plato’s most successful idea”93 as “[i]t 
has had enormous effect in the world in spite of its early, and crude, character”.94 However, the 
“endless chain of separation, binary division, and classification”95 that Plato’s systematisation 
of nature led to “was largely lost during the early middle ages”96 and only partly re-discovered 
in the twelfth century. Yet, Glenn continues, “Platonic forms of reasoning”97 eventually re-
emerged and came to inform conceptual elaborations in the philosophical, political, and 
juridical thinking of such figures as Bodin, Hobbes, and Kelsen.  
Another important step in the renaissance of binary thinking was taken with the advent of 
codification, which “had, as its most essential role, the elimination of diversity within states”.98 
Further, “codes themselves were elaborate efforts towards logical coherence, understood in the 
classical sense”.99 Glenn also concedes that “[t]he role of binary logic in all of this can never 
be precisely established”.100 However, he continues, “its visibility precludes any conclusion 
that is played no role”.101 This is a key-passage in Glenn’s reflections as it serves to 
contextualise his overall argument regarding the beneficial properties of non-binary thinking 
by highlighting a specific feature of divisionary approaches to reality. Indeed, after having 
asserted that “Holmes was correct to back away from his initial position”102 on law being a 
matter of experience rather than logic, Glenn further specifies that “[i]t is not the case… that 
classical or binary logic is entirely incompatible with cosmopolitan perspectives. There are 
cosmopolitan limits to the closure it would bring about”.103 As is the case with every closure, 
the closures that characterised the age of nationalisms were therefore deemed to be only 
partially successful due to the fallacy of their constructivism rationalism, as Friedrich Hayek 
observed: “closures are never definitive and ongoing texture provides the stuff of newer and 
larger forms of coherence”.104 
Glenn later returns on this point, after having touched on two non-binary forms of logics: 
multivalent and modal. Regarding the former, Glenn notes that it predates Aristotle and that its 
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104 Ibid., p. 265. 
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“essential characteristic… is that it is a ‘degree-theoretic’ in replacing a binary option with one 
that tolerates degrees, usually expressed as degrees of truth (as in the statement ‘there is some 
truth in that’)”.105 Modal logic is instead concerned “with different modes in which things may 
be true or false, particularly their necessity, possibility, or impossibility”.106 Importantly, “[t]he 
cosmopolitan dimension of modal logic is found in the idea that modes might vary according 
to ‘possible worlds’ in which they are found”.107 Yet, Glenn duly observes, “[o]ne difficulty 
may be in the fact that modal logic is often treated as simply supplementary to classical logic, 
not challenging it as directly as does multivalent logic”.108  
Glenn moves on to briefly describe the “explicit legal challenge to classical logic”109 from 
Stephen Toulmin to Neil MacCormick, passing through some of the leading cases on the 
subject, such as the Kosovo decision of the International Court of Justice. Noting that the 
“[d]ebate on the application of the new logics to law… is still in its infancy”,110 Glenn 
substantiates his argument on the limits of rational closures through a contextualisation of the 
cosmopolitan logics that inform the three case studies he discussed earlier – constitutionalism, 
common laws, and institutional cosmopolitanism.111 Each of these cases proves that despite 
what might be contrary thought, law has “already discovered cosmopolitan forms of logics”.112 
In this sense, learning from past experiences, “[t]he task for a cosmopolitan, paraconsistent 
logic in law would… be to acknowledge legal contradictions, to preserve existing legal 
diversity, and to provide cosmopolitan and practical forms of dispute resolution for the judge 
of the cosmopolitan state”.113 Having so claimed, Glenn commences his reflections on 
“cosmopolitan logics and legal diversity” by saying that: 
Binary or classical logic is hostile to the existence of contradictions in law, either 
seeking to eliminate them though legal means (legal unification or application of 
superior, priority-giving principles) or rejecting the possibility of legal resolutions 
of them (since an extra-legal intervention is required, or both).114 
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Fortunately, Glenn continues, by transposing pluralist thinking’s properties within the legal 
dimension, cosmopolitan forms of legal ordering reject binary logic’s dicta in two ways. First, 
as in the private law dimension, they “fully accep[t] the existence and even the need for 
recognition of contradictory norms”.115 Secondly, they “avoi[d] univalent choice between 
norms seen as conflicting”.116 Thus, as indicated above, what in binary thinking would be an 
element of violence and conflict is transformed into its opposite, i.e. an act of tolerance. This 
is because “[c]osmopolitan logic works within a larger intellectual cadre. There is no single 
unity to be obtained, but conciliatory recognition of multiple unities, corresponding to the 
present state of the world”.117 
Embracing this inclusive mode of thinking would let us appreciate that constitutionalism has 
never been “dichotomous”.118 More particularly, “[t]he dichotomous nature of 
constitutionalism breaks down in constitutional experience… and this is demonstrably so with 
respect to the origin of states, the failure of states, and the functioning of states”.119 A similar 
point can be made regarding the development of “the notion of common law over the last three 
centuries”120 which, Glenn claims, has been characterised by “national and jurisdictional 
closures”.121 Thus “[t]he underlying logic of common laws [has never ceased to be] 
cosmopolitan or multivalent in character”.122 Regarding “institutional cosmopolitanism”, its 
“essential feature… is the coexistence of institutions, often on the same territory. Their mutual 
recognition dispels any notion of a single locus of sovereign authority and ensures the 
legitimacy of both”.123 This applies to internal (i.e. between public actors or public and private 
actors) as well as external relations, of which the European Union is a clear example, as Glenn 
demonstrates drawing on such scholars as Nico Krisch, Miguel Maduro, and Nicholas Barber.  
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ENZO MELANDRI 
Introducing Enzo Melandri 
There are several reasons for exploring Glenn’s thought on classical and pluralist logics 
through the lens of Enzo Melandri’s philosophy. The first emerges from what Luca Guidetti, a 
student of Melandri, wrote in his afterword to one of Melandri’s most famous books gathering 
ten lectures given in 1988, entitled Contro il Simbolico (Against the Symbolic):124  
The dominant thought in Melandri’s work… is that Western philosophical culture 
ought to be understood as the continuous representation, at different levels, of the 
same semantic schemes and intellectual stances which were already present in 
ancient times with regards to the notion of identity.125  
Further, Guidetti tells us that to Melandri, in the Western tradition, “identity serves ‘to restore 
order in the world’ against our originary and daily gaze caused by the ‘astonishment’ of 
realising that [the world] is not as it first appears”.126 Finally, Guidetti further observes that this 
process of “restructuration”,127 and thus, we might add, of meaning-generation, develops in 
two phases. The former corresponds to the archaic philosophers’ isomorphism and revolving 
around the “elementary, intuitive, and pre-symbolic (a=a)”128 notion of identity where “thought 
and reality”129 overlap; the latter emerges out of the critique of isomorphic thinking through 
the development of a notion of “motivational and functional notion of identity, eminently 
symbolic and discursive (aA), where ‘A’ is the concept, the substance, or the idea”.130 
Guidetti’s comments make it clear that Melandri focussed his efforts on the processes through 
which identity and its meaning are generated and conveyed. As I show below, Melandri’s 
philosophical stance on these themes clearly relates to Glenn’s views on the ontology (identity) 
and epistemology (communication) of traditions, discussed earlier. While some might contend 
that Glenn does not directly embark upon philosophical (including phenomenological) 
thinking, the inherently philosophical nature of his reflections is confirmed not only by his 
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remarks on Plato and other philosophers but also by the very nature of his analysis. Hence the 
relevance of contextualising Glenn’s scholarship on the subject through the work of a 
philosopher and phenomenologist like Melandri, who not only offered invaluable insights on 
how reality is apprehended and shared, but also made significant contributions on logical and 
analogical reasoning.  
Another reason to read Glenn and Melandri together is that, as will be demonstrated, to the 
latter, the original terrain of analogy is that of contrariety (and corresponding ‘symmetry’, or 
‘di-polarity’) between its elements. Analogical reasoning, which to Melandri defines the very 
nature and operativity of philosophical thinking, not only proceeds by comparing its elements, 
but in certain instances, it does so proportionally: every analogy, be it of qualitative 
(attribution) or quantitative (proportion),131 is and can only be a “medium comparationis”.132 
Analogical thinking thus lies at the threshold of comparative and philosophical inquiry.  
Finally, the pertinence of the proposed discussion is confirmed by the fact that despite being a 
philosopher and not a lawyer, Melandri had a strong interest in legal reasoning and 
argumentation as demonstrated by his 1968 article on the subject.133 
Before going any further, however, it is necessary to provide some background information on 
Melandri as both his person and thoughts are fairly unknown in the English-speaking world. 
Born in Genoa in 1926, Melandri graduated in philosophy from the University of Bologna in 
1958, to then take a lectureship in Italian language at the University of Kiel in West Germany 
(1958-1961). Melandri later returned to Italy to teach various philosophical subjects (including 
theoretical philosophy) at the universities of Lecce, Bologna, and Trieste until his death in 
Faenza in 1993. A prolific writer,134 Melandri’s magnum opus is the book La Linea e il Circolo 
(The Line and the Circle), discussed in this article. First published in 1968 and counting twenty-
one chapters divided in three parts and 154 sections (for a total of more than 800 pages, in its 
current edition), with extensive passages from original sources in German, French, English, 
Greek, Latin, LC is an incredibly dense work of continental philosophy and a magisterial 
example of the analytical depth and accuracy that characterise Italian doctrinal thought. 
Unfortunately, until recently LC has not received the attention it deserves. As Giorgio 
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Agamben aptly notes in his introduction to LC’s new edition, this was due to internal fights 
within the Italian academy.135 However, the fact that a prominent publisher has decided to 
publish it anew136 and that Agamben, arguably one of the greatest and most discussed living 
philosophers, wrote an introductory essay in which he defined it as “a masterpiece of twentieth 
century European philosophy”,137 are testament to its ongoing significance.  
 
 
Logic and Analogy in Melandri’s Thought 
A comprehensive discussion of Melandri’s dense philosophy in LC would require an extended 
treatment, certainly more than can be provided here. Hence, I limit myself to setting out those 
elements of Melandri’s analytics that relate to my present argument. Melandri’s aim in LC is 
twofold. First, to show that “logic does not exhaust the field of the rational”.138 There is indeed 
another form of reasoning that, contrary to what has been argued, is fully rational. This is 
reasoning by analogies, something that we all do “ten, one hundred, a thousand times a day”.139 
Secondly, Melandri wants to show that logic and analogy mutually inform each other through 
a relationship of “transcendental complementarity”140, rather than opposition. This means that 
the relationship between logic and analogy is itself analogical.141 I return to this below. 
Having set out the limits of other approaches to the subject (i.e. natural-historical; critical-
historical; semiotic; etc.), Melandri explains why, to substantiate the above claims, he opted 
for a philosophical archaeology that is both phenomenological and transcendental. In 
particular, Melandri tells us that his intention is “to combine the thematic [dimension] and the 
structure” of analogical thinking in a journey through the “topics” and “functions” that define 
it.142 Being an archaeology, Melandri further specifies, his analysis can only be deconstructive 
and regressive and thus operates differently from processes of rationalisation, which are 
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naturally progressive and future-oriented.143 Melandri’s choice is anything but casual. As he 
writes, 
[a]rchaeology is subliminal, in that it moves beneath the discriminatory line of 
historiography and history, conscious and unconscious, rationalised and irrational. 
As all that which is subliminal, archaeology too is based on the principle of analogy 
and not on that of identity and difference.144  
Two things should be noted about this statement. First, Melandri makes an indirect reference 
to binary logic’s exclusionary razor, an element which also features at the centre of Glenn’s 
analysis. Secondly, Melandri’s statement might hide a fatal inconsistency: indeed, the reader 
might question how Melandri can claim that archaeological inquiry is a-rational and analogical, 
while at the same time asserting that analogical thinking is fully rational. The answer lies in 
the negative use that archaeology makes of reason in its regressive movement. Crucially, 
Melandri goes on, from a logical point of view, analogies’ regressive dynamics make no sense 
and appear “pseudo-scientific”.145 However, despite being “extra-logical”,146 analogical 
inference is ultimately rational. Logicians’ view that “analogy is not a legitimate form of 
inference but is, at most, a trope or a mode of induction”147 is therefore misplaced and 
misleading. 
 
Logic’s and Analogy’s Rationality 
As seen in the previous Section, to Melandri the field of the rational is not exhausted by logic. 
Analogies too are a rational tool without which human thinking cannot operate. Melandri 
reiterates this point at the end of what is arguably LC’s most important chapter, entitled 
‘Symmetry’. As Agamben argues in his introduction to LC, Melandri neither “thematically”148 
defines what an analogy is, nor is “‘the principle of analogy’, which is repeatedly evoked in 
contraposition to [logics’] ‘principle of identity’… clearly formulated”.149 This can be easily 
explained by recalling that, according to Melandri, there is no such thing as a concept of 
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‘analogy’. If a concept is “a genre which includes all sub-species”,150 then analogical reasoning 
escapes conceptual representationalism. Yet Melandri’s definition of analogy can be worked 
out through a close reading of this chapter and in particular of the table in which he sets out 
and compares what he believes are the seven principles governing the complementary 
relationship between logical and analogical forms of reasoning.151 Logical thought, Melandri 
asserts, “hinges on seven, extremely solid principles”152 to which there correspond an equal 
number of “contrary principles”153 in its analogical counterpart. This explains why logic and 
analogy are transcendentally defined by their complementary as contrariety, which Melandri 
defines in terms of “inverse proportionality”.154 Three of these principles are of particular 
interest for our purposes. These are:155 
Logic: 
1) Principle of ‘everything-or-nothing’, of bivalence (true-or-false), and of the excluded 
middle. 
2) Principle of excluded contradiction.156 The presence of a contradiction in the premise 
voids the inference of every probabilistic value. 
3) Principle of elementary identity: given two complementary predicates, P and –P, to any 
given subject x there belongs necessarily either one or the other… 
 
Analogy: 
1) Principle of continuous graduation, of dipolarity (between truemax and falsemax) and of the 
included middle… 
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2) Principle of included contradiction, of contrariety, and of tension. No contradiction is 
decisive, ever. An inference proves something when leading to a paradox only. 
3) Principle of functional identity: the subject has no identity in itself, but only as x value 
meeting the requirements of the function it depends on…  
 
Interestingly, the same exact principles and table appear in Melandri’s 1968 article on legal 
reasoning and argumentation,157 which I briefly consider in the next Section. What interests 
me here is that according to this comparative analytics, analogy’s ontological strength is that it 
creates a relationship of contrariety (“A↔B”158) between its elements. Contrary to what occurs 
with logic’s principle of non-contradiction (“A/–A”159), analogical thought places its elements 
in a relationship of inverse proportionality, or constitutive symmetry, which lets them appear 
for what they truly are.  
Here Melandri goes back to Aristotle, who famously observed that, while logic can move from 
the universal to the particular and vice-versa (deductive and inductive logic), analogy can only 
move from the particular to the particular. Analogy is, to Aristotle, a special form of inference 
that operates paradigmatically. Melandri agrees with Aristotle’s findings, but rejects the 
premises of his analysis, which he defines as “fundamentally incorrect”160 and, he claims, have 
“generated a confusion still lasting today”.161 In particular, the problem with Aristotle’s 
“incongruent”162 classification is that “it is based on the nature of the terms – general or 
particular – and not on the form of argument”163 around which analogical thinking revolves. 
This not only distracts us from the way analogical arguments operate but obfuscates their 
capacity to overcome what Melandri calls the ‘ontological chasm’ between name and language, 
or nominal and propositional semantic, which has been affecting Western philosophy (and, 
consequently, thinking more generally) since its origin. 
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I discuss the latter theme in the next Section. First it should be noted that, to Melandri, moving 
away from Aristotle and his followers has profound repercussions on how reality is approached 
and comprehended. What Aristotle and subsequent thinkers, particularly John Stuart Mill, did 
not realise is that what renders analogical reasoning special is the fact that its ‘extra-logical’ 
rationality generates, as already noted, a constitutive symmetry between its objects. Agamben 
aptly summarises Melandri’s argument on this point by saying that by introducing a tertium 
comparationis in addition to the two terms around which logic’s dichotomous dynamics 
revolves (‘neither A, nor B, but C’; as opposed to ‘either A or B’), every analogy can be thought 
of as a “field” created by the “vectorial tensions” between the three terms.164 The creation of 
this field, or space of appearance, proves that analogies void the exclusionary properties of 
logical thinking. This is also why, in contrast to the latter, analogical reasoning welcomes 
intermediate gradations and proportions (“truemax and falsemax”).
165  
Analogies, then, have linguistic-ontological constitutive properties. Yet, it might be noted, 
Melandri’s argument begs the interrogative as to whether analogical reasoning, in both its 
operativity and scope, can in fact be distinguished from pluralist logics – that is to say, those 
forms of logic which, according to a view also shared by Glenn, challenge the exclusionary 
approach to life proper of binary thinking and logic. It is indeed commonly thought that, as is 
the case with analogical reasoning, pluralist logics too are characterised by the introduction of 
various tertia comparationis that deactivate classical logic’s exclusionary dynamics. Melandri, 
however, disagrees with this view: while “non-Aristotelian logic” (a term which Melandri uses 
to refer to modal, probabilistic, and plurivalent logics) does introduce a third element, it 
ultimately operates through the same binary exclusions that underpin classical logic. The 
tertium, Melandri argues, is never effectively datur in non-classical logics; it is an illusion. 
This is because of logic’s rationality which, even in its non-orthodox variants, is that of 
“rectifying discourse… through a process which is as much as possible rectilinear and one-
sided”.166 The problem, once again, is linguistic-ontological: “logic’s language… only 
provides reality with a form, but… communicates nothing”.167 That of logic is, in other words, 
a procedural and universal, rather than substantial and finite, truth.   
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above. 
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It was seen above that the notion of identity plays a pivotal role in Glenn’s reflections on the 
need for (comparative) legal scholars to overcome the exclusionary approach of binary thinking 
proper of classical logic. The same may be said with respect to Melandri’s philosophy in 
general (discussed earlier), as well on his thoughts on logic and analogy. To Melandri, logic, 
including the various non-classical variants praised by Glenn, exerts a “legislative function” 
rooted in its subscription to a principle of “elementary identity” that is ultimately 
“monopolar”.168 Analogies move instead within a comparative space of constitutive symmetry, 
and thus, di-polarity,169 where the identity of the elements under consideration can express 
itself fully.  
Melandri also shows this by elaborating on the ways in which classical logics and analogical 
thinning are visually represented. In particular, logic’s principle of non-contradiction is 
expressed by using the same term (‘A’) twice (‘A/¬A’).170 On the contrary, analogical 
thinking’s comparative (i.e. symmetric and di-polar) movement between its elements (what 
Agamben calls ‘vectorial tension’, mentioned above) is instead expressed by using two 
different terms, ‘A’ and ‘B’.171 Thus, while logic voids even in the symbols it deploys the 
alterity of the other, analogical thinking brings it to light and affirms it. The different 
categorisation of its own terms confirms that contrary to the logical variant, analogical 
rationality – especially when used in juridical analysis – hides a “creative” and “progressist 
force,”172 which instead of obfuscating alterity and otherness, lets them fully appear for what 
they are. From this it follows that the type of truth established by analogical thinking is 
substantial and never “perfect”173 (whereas the procedural truth of logical reasoning is always 
formal and exact). 
Here we reach the core of Melandri’s philosophy on logic and analogy. Indeed, in chapter four 
of LC, Melandri makes it clear that logic’s and analogy’s approach to the principle of identity 
ought to be comprehended on ontological, and thus philosophical, grounds. This central theme 
of Melandri’s thought offers not only a more accurate account of what has today become a sort 
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169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid., p. 371. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Melandri, note 133 above, p. 22. Melandri put forward this argument through a critique of Norberto Bobbio’s 
view. Cf. Susan Haack, “On Logic in the Law: “Something, but not All’”, Ratio Juris, XX (2007), pp. 1, 23. 
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of cliché in philosophical circles – i.e. language’s nihilism over reality, a categorisation which 
is too simplistically deployed without reaching the analytical depth reached by Melandri.174 
More fundamentally, it is also one of peculiar relevance for our discussion given that it is this 
article’s claim that beneath Glenn’s reflections on logical pluralism there lies a philosophical 
problem (discussed below).  
Melandri’s analysis in that chapter focuses on the above-mentioned conflict between the plane 
of the ‘name’ and that of ‘language’, or “nominal” and “propositional semantics”,175 which, he 
asserts, has never ceased underpinning and defining Western philosophy since its inception. 
According to nominal semantics, the most important element of language is the name. It is the 
name that has and conveys meaning through a direct and performative relation to (extra-
linguistic) reality. Melandri explains that nominal semantics is “denotative” and “extensional”, 
drawing from Aristotle.176 While this approach has clear benefits (including “leading to a 
univocal type of language” through a “combinatory syntax”177), it also creates significant 
problems. Among these stands the association of reality with the ontic at the expenses of its 
ontological character. Propositional semantics offers a way out of this ontological impasse by 
prioritising the various elements of language, including their functional difference, without 
which there could be neither internal (i.e. within language) nor external (i.e. extra-linguistic) 
intelligibility.  
The first mode in which the ‘name-language’ antithesis materialised itself was that of the 
tension between the Parmenedian epos and the Heraclitean logos.178 The fact that these two 
planes can only overlap “per accidens”179 leads to an “ontological chasm”, which, as Agamben 
observes, “involves language’s (and, thus thought’s) very reference to being”.180 Melandri 
defines this ontological non-coincidence thus: “Heraclitus centres semantics on the name and 
in so doing, discovers the contradictoriety of the logos. With Parmenides, the opposite occurs: 
semantics fully coincides with the proposition. In this way, Parmenides discovers the 
                                                          
174 See, for instance, Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things, trans. Zakiya Hanafi ([2014] 2015), pp. 57–98. 
175 Melandri, note 134, p. 157. 
176 Enzo Melandri, Alcune Note in Margine all’Organon Aristotelico ([1965] 2017), pp. 35–42. 
177 Melandri, note 134 above, p. 620. 
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28 
 
contradictoriety of the epos.”181 The fracture that arises from these opposing views is 
ontological because: 
if the individuation of what is real is based on the semantic univocity of the name, 
then language as a whole will result irreal because equivocal; on the contrary, if 
the individuation of what is real is based on the semantic univocity of [linguistic] 
proposition[s], then the nominal reference [within language] turns out to be irreal 
because equivocal.182 
It is in the space opened by this tension, Melandri contends, that humankind witnessed the 
emergence of philosophical thought and its double-featured concern with what plurality is and 
how language can express it effectively.183 As Agamben notes in his commentary on Melandri, 
“[p]hilosophy originates in Greece as the attempt of resolving in some way the ontological 
chasm which threatens to sink language’s very possibility to refer to the world”.184 With his 
analysis, Agamben continues, “Melandri has showed that this attempt cannot but pass from the 
desaturation of the principle of identity and the introduction of the principle of analogy”.185 
Melandri’s central claim is that by letting (instead of making, as classical and pluralist logics 
do), through the operational device of the tertium comparationis, things appear, analogical 
reasoning deactivates the ontological chasm between language and name by establishing a 
performative balance between their respective spheres – a middle ground of meaningful 
phenomenological denotations. As Melandri writes: “[t]he critique of the principle of identity 
does not determine the introduction of the principle of analogy, but it is its immediate 
prerequisite”.186 The detachment of reality (physis) from thought (logos) operated by Plato’s 
exclusionary logic – a subject on which Glenn expended much effort – can only be challenged 
on the plane of this ontological emergence.187 
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Setting the Level of Argument 
If one were to summarise Glenn’s take on pluralist thinking, one could draw from Luce Irigaray 
and say that the overcoming of binary modes of reasoning is the gateway for the discovery and 
promotion of a relational culture of normative diversity within comparative legal studies.188 
This approach ought to be warmly welcome to the extent that it challenges the instrumentalist 
use that, over the past few decades, comparative law has made of cultural identities and 
differences.189 In this sense, it can hardly be disputed that Glenn’s reflections might also assist 
scholars in solving some of comparative law’s “never-ending methodological self-doubts”190 
and therefore reaching its much-awaited “maturity”.191  
As this article shows, however, Glenn’s thought has far-reaching implications that transcend 
the purview of scholarly discourses on comparative law’s nature, scope, and method(s). In 
particular, Glenn’s analysis on cosmopolitan thinking suggests more fundamental questions 
regarding plurality’s ontological register. As mentioned earlier, this theme lies at the core of 
Western philosophy. Yet it also concerns Western jurisprudence, and specifically its 
constructivism – that is to say, its dependency upon reason’s and knowledge’s structuring 
properties as epitomised by logical and analogical thinking, and conceptual 
representationalism.  
While there is general agreement that Western jurisprudence has been constructivist since its 
very inception in the Late Roman Republic (dating to the second century BC),192 scholars 
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disagree as to whether the logical, analogical, and conceptual tools of reality-construction 
adopted by the Roman jurists were those which originated within Greek philosophy. The debate 
has mostly been of a historical rather than philosophical nature and has focused on Plato’s, 
Aristotle’s, and the Stoics’ actual influence on the development of Roman juridical categories 
and modes of thought.193  
For the purposes of this article, I propose to move the discussion from the historical to the 
philosophical plane. I submit that it is neither in Plato nor in Aristotle or the Stoics but 
elsewhere that we might find the philosophical paradigm that might shed new light on Western 
jurisprudence’s constructivist attitude. Indeed, as with Western thinking more generally, 
Western jurisprudence’s constructivism is philosophically related to the inception, with the 
Promethean myth, of a particular type of metaphysical thinking that uses reason and knowledge 
for ordering purposes. Reason and knowledge existed, of course, well before Aeschylus. 
However, as Emanuele Severino has shown, it is with Aeschylus’ works that they are both 
conceived, for the first time, as metaphysical devices to be used for controlling factical 
experience and transcending human finitude. Prometheus is the god who knows everything in 
advance (pro-mathḗs) and whose thinking moves on a rectilinear plane on which all that exists 
is effectually commeasured (pánt’ epistathmṓmenos). Following his ‘free will’, Prometheus 
decided to donate tékhnē to humankind so that it could liberate itself from the fear of pain, 
death, and unpredictability. He did so by placing a ‘blind hope’ in humans’ hearts, i.e. the hope 
to be capable of freely disposing of the world, and thus to forget human finitude and inevitable 
destiny.194 Soon thereafter, however, Prometheus realised that he had made the terrible 
mistake195 of thinking that tékhnē could free humankind from Necessity (Moira).196 In realising 
that nothing can escape Necessity, Prometheus reached his potential to see the future and 
gained a comprehensive, causal vision of phenomena. In other words, Prometheus moves from 
tékhnē to epistḗmē.197  
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31 
 
Two things should be noted here. First, to Aeschylus, “Prometheus’ heroic strength”198 resides 
precisely in having realised that only through “[epistḗmē’s] incontrovertible truth”199 humans 
can evade (that is, constructively dispose of) their facticity. However, and this is the second 
point, when Prometheus gave humankind a blind hope in the technical disposition of the world, 
he mistakenly led them to believe that procedural truth is capable of saving life from its 
finitude. With the movement from tékhnē to epistḗmē, the empowering belief of the former 
also came to define the latter: in the end, it is knowledge as achieved by the capacity to reason 
(i.e. commeasure ends with means for instrumental purposes) that liberates both Io and 
Prometheus, and thus mortals, from chaos and pain.200 This also confirms the regulatory – and 
thus never merely descriptive – character of knowledge and reason over reality. 
Epistathmṓmenos (meaning ‘to measure’ and which, Severino observes, is the “verbal mode 
through which epistēmē presents itself”201) derives from the substantive státhmē, which was 
the rope used to measure and work stone and wood in Ancient Greece, and which means 
“norm” or “rule”.202  
Adopting this philosophical perspective of inquiry has, I submit, meaningful implications. The 
most important of which is that it helps us appreciate that while debate on the role that the 
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic structuring of thinking and language has had in the 
development Western jurisprudence is certainly important, it should only be done after having 
uncovered the Agambenian zone of interaction, or indistinction, where the scientification of 
life and ius and the metaphysical construction of reality meet. On the reading proposed here, 
the claim that Roman juristic science was not a science in the modern sense of the term because 
it was instead an ars will have to be reconsidered: originating from Prometheus,203 no ars 
(tékhnē, in Greek) can do without reason’s metaphysical constructivism nor operate without 
epistemic ambitions. The same applies to the literature that emphasises the movement from the 
casuistic, roughly inductive method of the Roman jurists, to the more refined inductive, 
dialectical and analogical one of their medieval counterparts, to the deductive and axiomatic 
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methods of humanist and modern thinkers. Here too the pervasive role of reason and knowledge 
has been overlooked. An alternative view is offered in what follows. 
 
Logic, Analogy, and Conceptual Representationalism in Law 
A clarification is in order at this point. A treatment of the origins and development of Western 
jurisprudence as a rational and epistemic activity (scientia iuris) is beyond the scope of this 
article. The topic has already been extensively explored in both the Common and Civil law 
traditions by those thinkers who promoted a scientific approach to law and legal reasoning or 
inquired whether law is a social science, as well as by those who wrote on such topics as legal 
methodology and epistemology.204 For the purposes of our discussion it will suffice to note the 
following. 
According to Schiavone, the separation, with the promulgation of the Twelve Tables in 451-
450 BC, of ius (“the original nucleus… of Roman civic ordering… based on the rules of an 
ancient practice, once intermingled with religion and cult rituality”205) and lex (“the regulatory 
presence of ‘the rule of the people’”206, or “political rule”207) has represented a major disruptive 
event in Western law. One pivotal consequence of this ontological break208 was that it led, 
starting from the fourth century BC,209 to the transformation of juristic thinking and practice 
into scientia iuris – that is, an abstract “cognitive operation”,210 or “intellectual practice”,211 
which rendered “law an authentic form of metaphysics”212 and became “the motor of any 
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development of ius”.213 With time, this led to the jurists’ “self-isolation… in a universe made 
solely of forms, propositions, defined and hidden compatibilities”.214 
It can hardly be disputed that, despite all the methodological shifts that have characterised 
Western jurisprudence’s development,215 legal analysis, reasoning, and argumentation have 
been functioning along similar lines since Roman times. True, the Romans did not have law 
schools in the modern (i.e. medieval216) sense of the term.217 And true, as Geoffrey Samuel has 
correctly observed, the Roman jurists “were not interested in formulating definitions and 
theories”.218 Nor was their reasoning ever “advance[d] beyond the inductive stage”.219 This 
certainly cannot be said with respect to the juristic activities of the medieval and modern 
periods, when more refined inductive as well as deductive methods of analysis were developed. 
Yet, few would doubt that the juridical methods of metaphysical abstraction based on reason’s 
transcendental modus operandi and cognitive processes of reality-decoding that Schiavone 
places at the centre of Roman juristic thought have not been informing the study and practice 
of law in the West since then and shaped the very core of Western legal consciousness.220  
What the West witnessed with the rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in the Middle Ages 
was the inception of systematic legal education and practice revolving around rational 
abstraction and epistemic constructivism epitomised by logical and analogical modes of 
analysis and conceptual representations.221 This is why it is only after having uncovered 
reason’s and knowledge’s Promethean substratum that a full appreciation of ancient Greek 
thinking’s legacy over the development of Western jurisprudence (particularly after the second 
half of the twelfth century) is possible. Law’s dependency upon reason and knowledge applies 
to both its study and knowledge (epistēmē) and the study and knowledge of how to reason/think 
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like a lawyer (phrónēsis). In Aristotle, whose works exerted a prominent influence on Roman 
and then medieval jurisprudence, particularly from the second half of the twelfth century,222 
epistēmē and phrónēsis are two of the intellectual virtues through which the mind achieves 
truth.223 This mode of thought profoundly inspired the mediaeval jurists’ didactics and belief – 
proper of medieval science’s systematic abstractness224 – that the apprehension of legal practice 
is a transcendental, cognitivist, and (ana)logical endeavour. After that, both the study and 
practice of law became wholly constructivist in the Humanist and subsequent modern 
periods.225 In this sense, rather than being antithetical, scientia iuris and iuris prudentia are two 
defining and mutually reinforcing elements of Western jurisprudence. Thus, Samuel too 
ultimately concedes that asking whether there have been Khunn-like ‘revolutions’ in Western 
jurisprudence “is asking the wrong question”.226 According to Samuel, this is because Khunn 
developed his theory “within the domain of the natural sciences where, of course, the object of 
these sciences is ultimately external and independent of the science itself”.227 On the contrary, 
“[l]aw is quite different as a discipline. There never really was a time when a legal theory 
becomes either falsified or fully incapable of offering an adequate account of the legal 
world”.228 The lesson to be learnt from all of this is that as a rational and epistemic activity, 
law cannot do without abstract techniques of world-construction (Weltbild).229   
A search for the use of logical and analogical modes of judicial and scholarly analysis, 
reasoning, and argumentation in both Civil and Common law jurisdictions, particularly in such 
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branches of law as contracts and torts,230 confirms the accuracy of these reflections. In 
literature, a good example for our purposes is Giovanni Sartor’s recent call for the “correct”231 
way of reasoning in law, and significantly, his argument that “legal reasoning can be viewed 
as an application of a broader human competence that is, practical cognition or practical 
rationality”.232 Sartor, who like Glenn endorses a “pluralist extension of legal logic”233 as a 
“way of modelling both the reciprocal closure and openness of different normative systems”,234 
defines practical cognition as “the ability of processing information in order to come to 
appropriate determinations”.235 Not coincidentally, half of Sartor’s dense analysis is dedicated 
to “the logical structures of legal thinking”.236 Further examples could be given, including 
Nicholas F. Lucas’s praise of the study, in law, of “the science of the principles and conditions 
of correct thinking”, or “the admirable mental discipline” that is logic for giving us, through 
rigorous “mental training… the power and habit of thinking clearly”;237 Vern R. Walker’s 
reading of legal reasoning’s pragmatic nature as resulting from the combination of, among 
other components, the “epistemic side of law aim[ing] at truth”238 and deductive, inductive and 
abductive logic;239 or Emily Scherwin’s argument on the “epistemic and institutional 
advantages” of analogical reasoning in law.240 
 
A Diachronic Approach to Logic’s (and Analogy’s) Constructivism 
What has emerged from our account of Melandri’s analytic on logic and analogy is that they 
both operate along reason’s metaphysical, constructivist plane for epistemic (i.e. ordering, in 
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Promethean terms) purposes. In particular, logic (both “the science of truth”241 and “science’s 
primary instrument”242) dialectically connects elements of reality by transcending their 
spatiality and temporality and including them in all-encompassing frameworks of intelligibility 
through judgement (adaequatio rei et intellectus). Thus, Heidegger aptly spoke of the 
metaphysical foundations of logic.243 This is how, through what Ernst Cassirer – referring to 
Bacon’s, Leibniz’s, and Hobbes’ attacks on scholasticism – called logic’s “constructive 
activity”,244 beings as phenomena are known.  
At first glance, by introducing various tertia comparationis within the given purview of 
analysis – and thus, by seemingly prioritising substance and context over form and abstractness 
– pluralist logics and analogical modes of reasoning seem to evade logic’s ‘procedural truth’. 
Yet, in fact, they are fully dependent upon it and replicate it under a different guise. This is not 
just because, as Melandri observed, rationality propels both.245 On semantic grounds too, non-
classical logics’ and analogy’s ‘-logy’ suffix reveal that they both are, and cannot but be, 
defined negatively via reference to logic’s transcendental nature and technical functioning. As 
the later Heidegger not coincidentally observed in a set of lectures dedicated to the 
Parmenidean notion of identity (which is directly related to the principle of identity discussed 
by both Glenn and Melandri):  
… -logy hides more than just the logical in the sense of what is consistent and 
generally in the nature of a statement, what structures, moves, secures, and 
communicates all scientific knowledge. 
In each case, the -Logia is the totality of a nexus of grounds accounted for, within 
which nexus the objects of the sciences are represented in respect of their ground, 
that is, are conceived.246 
                                                          
241 Nicholas J.J. Smith, Logic: The Laws of Truth (2012), p. 4. Emphasis in original. At this point, it might be 
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Conceptual Representationalism, Experience, and Knowledge 
The chief distinction Western thinking has been relying upon for over two millennia to 
synthetise (less philosophically, we could say organise) the real and make sense of plurality is 
between particulars and universal. Indeed, as philosophers (particularly, phenomenologists) tell 
us, when we ask what something is (say, a table or a friend standing before us), what we are 
actually asking is two interrelated questions. First, whether we only experience it/her as a 
factical object/subject at a given point in space and time or, rather, whether, through its/her 
effective presence, we also come to know what constitutes it/her (i.e. what are its/her 
incontrovertible, defining features as that particular object/subject in its/her ipseity and as 
opposed to another). Secondly, whether it/she is a representation (or expression) of one or more 
universal qualities that, while defining it/her, might also be shared by other particulars (i.e. the 
table’s colour or that of our friend’s eyes); in philosophical terms, the question here is whether 
that table/friend exhausts the essence, ‘beingness’, etc. of table-colourness/blue-eyeness in 
universal terms. Following Severino, while both queries inevitably lead to further, especially 
linguistic-ontological, interrogatives, they ultimately meet in a single, overreaching one: 
whether what is certain (our experiences, leaving scepticism aside) is also true (epistḗmē as 
incontrovertible knowledge achieved through logos, reason). 
Unsurprisingly, being simultaneously an ethereal and situational phenomenon, law is a fertile 
terrain for these sorts of inquiries. Most of the time, however, in law as in other disciplines, the 
particulars-universals problem is approached conceptually – that is, concepts take the place of 
universals. In this way, being a concept “a genre which comprises all sub-species”247, the 
validity of a given particular is verified (i.e. commeasured, in Promethean terms) against the 
defining features of the concept it is supposed (or not) to be an expression of. This assessment 
is carried out through various, including context-dependent, analytical reductions. 
In Western philosophy, it was Socrates who first found in concepts the solution to efficiently 
mediate between truth and experience, or Heraclitus and Parmenides.248 The significance of 
Socrates’ move can hardly be exaggerated: today, a leading encyclopaedia of philosophy still 
states that “[c]oncepts are the constituents of thought”.249 Heidegger would have agreed: as he 
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/ (accessed 19 June 2019). 
38 
 
described them, concepts are “determinative representations”250 that act as filters through 
which we cognitively order what exists. Now, given knowledge’s constructivism, it is usually 
held that non-conceptual forms of thinking lead to confusion and approximation. As Aeschylus 
made clear, knowledge requires order, which in turn requires categorisation along reason’s 
metaphysical measuring properties. Not coincidentally, in an effort to think of a thinking that 
can do without the “calculating self-adjustment of ratio”,251 i.e. a thinking capable of “free[ing] 
ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking”,252 Heidegger denounced that “[w]e 
[have come to] know rigorous thinking only as conceptual representation”.253 And indeed, if 
“intuitions without concepts”, as Immanuel Kant reminded us, “are blind”,254 it comes as no 
surprise that “doing without concepts” as Edouard Machery boldly suggested, seems 
impracticable (to say the least).255  
There appears to be agreement among scholars that this applies to the comparative studies of 
cultures, societies, and political systems on the one hand, as well as to law and legal reasoning 
on the other, both within and outside the comparative dimension. Regarding the former, in his 
last and, arguably, most important book on comparative methodology, the leading political 
scientist Giovanni Sartori made an important call for the overcoming of the “empirical 
vaporisation”256 which, he believed, affects the comparative analysis of political structures and 
phenomena. This can only be done, Sartori argued, by first acknowledging that “to compare is 
to control”;257 and secondly, rejecting the processes of “concept malformation,”258 “conceptual 
stretching,”259 “conceptual atrophy”,260 and the various misuses of logical tools261 around 
which the discipline of political science had been developing since the 1950s. This requires 
appreciating that “[i]n every cognitive process, at least three elements are involved: a) 
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concepts; b) words; c) phenomena” and that a concept is a “conception which is treated 
according to logical rules”.262 The role of concepts among these elements is “central”263 insofar 
as in the social sciences meaning needs to be “structured via logical rules and systematic 
‘coordination’”.264 Without concepts’ “unity of thought”265 and their correct use there cannot 
be meaningful comparison: rigorous “induction, observation, and experimentation”266 as well 
as conceptual thinking267 are the only means to avoid the “theoretical and empirical chaos”268 
that has been affecting the incessant “expansion”269 of their discipline over the past few 
decades. With respect to comparative legal studies in particular, a similar point has been made 
by Franz von Benda-Beckmann with respect to the comparative study of legal cultures, or 
cross-cultural legal analysis.270  
Moving on to law and legal reasoning, in an important essay Brian Bix has demonstrated that 
conceptual enquires serve different purposes. In particular, holding that “[c]onceptual analysis 
is an integral part of legal theory”,271 in his account Bix “offered four alternatives for 
conceptual claims: (1) they are arbitrary stipulations; (2) they track linguistic usage; (3) they 
try to explain what is ‘important’ or ‘interesting’ about some matter; and (4) they establish an 
evaluative test for the label…”.272 Despite their apparent difference, it could be said that what 
unites these functions is that they all convey meaning, thereby helping the interpreter to 
assemble reality (in phenomenological terms, the actual) for cognitivist purposes.273  
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The latter claim can also be supported by considering other accounts, commencing with Ronald 
D. Kelley’s historical reconstruction of “the conceptual colonization of the natural world, by 
which men began to lay the foundations of their own civilizing [i.e. chaos-avoiding] structure 
of Nomos”.274 One could also consider Dennis Lloyd’s explanation of why, to operate in a 
“rational and systematic way”,275 the law needs concepts – “the essential tools of human 
reflection, communication, and decision”.276 Similarly, in a more recent essay that appeared in 
a volume aimed at shedding new light on how to rethink legal scholarship for the highly diverse 
functioning and transformative interactions of today’s legal orders, Neil Komesar asserted that: 
Law is vast and complex. To explore it and to understand it requires a mode of 
organizing what we know and what we need to know. That means establishing a 
way to determine what is important and why. In short, we need an analytical 
framework.277  
The point has been made by others as well. For instance, in a passage that needs to be cited in 
full for its relevance, Samuel holds that: 
The object of science is not the phenomenon of the real world; the object consists 
of the schematic construction or abstract model of this real world and science itself 
is the exploitation of such models to explain and predict the phenomenon modelled. 
This epistemological thesis is equally – or perhaps one should say analogously – 
applicable to law since this is a discourse or ‘science’ (intellectus) which does not 
operate directly on the fact (res). What lawyers do is to construct a model of the 
social world and it is, arguably, this model which acts as the bridge between the 
social and legal worlds. The model is both the res (object of knowledge) and the 
intellectus (knowing subject).278 
Hence “[c]oncepts and categories are… fundamental aspects of legal knowledge”.279 Indeed, 
Samuel continues: 
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[f]acts need to be classified… making sense of acts beyond the individual case 
involves schemes of intelligibility that will organise these facts according to 
‘scientific’ discourse that itself will be organised into conceptual categories. 
Knowledge is inconceivable without classification.280 
This can be better appreciated if we consider that “[l]egal reasoning is about manipulating facts 
(accomodatio factorum) to make them conform in an isomorphic way with a conceptual 
structure implied by a legal text (statute, contract, or will) or by a precedent or line of 
precedents”.281 Legal reasoning’s subjection to “virtual”282 as opposed to actual facts should 
prompt us to reverse the maxim “ex facto ius oritur”283 to “ex iure factum oritur”.284 Needless 
to say, this not only applies to factual reconstructions, but also to legal interpretation techniques 
in both the Civil and Common law traditions.285 A similar argument has been made by Roger 
Cotterrell, a leading legal sociologist within the comparative study of legal cultures. In his new, 
important book, which advocates a sensitive jurisprudence capable of blending together 
theoretical and empirical inquiry while endorsing law’s “well-being”,286 Cotterrell observes 
that: 
Concepts and categories are central to the lawyer’s stock in trade. They are means 
of classifying and distinguishing situations and issues for the purposes of legal 
analysis. They are crucial to the organisation and systematisation of legal doctrine. 
And they are crucial also to social inquiry – fundamental in the construction of 
social theories and in the rational structuring and interpretation of empirical social 
research. We cannot speak or write without concepts; they are tools for the 
organisation of thought. So, their clarification is an obviously important aspect as 
of social scientific work.287 
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Cotterrell’s view is particularly important for our discussion. For not only does it exclude the 
possibility of thinking without conceptual representations, but it does so in a book that 
repeatedly stresses the importance of appreciating, within juristic analysis, experiential (i.e. 
contextual and local) modes of cultural living.288  
This begs the question of whether experiences can in fact be decoded, conceptualised, and 
therefore known – an interrogative all the more relevant if we think of law (and regulatory 
dynamics) as a matter of shared normative experiences.289 A second and related theme is 
whether experience can in fact be distinguished from knowledge. Phenomenological thinking 
offers some valuable insights in this respect. Indeed, phenomenologists commonly hold that 
there are two different forms of experience: Erlebnis and Erfahrung.290 The former indicates 
the very factical act of living without epistemic ambitions (or lived experience), while the 
second involves a critical attitude towards reality that hinges on both practical reason’s guiding 
purpose in life and the value of knowledge as an end result.291 While only the latter mode of 
experience is considered, within Husserlian philosophy, the proper mode of approaching the 
world, it has been both directly and indirectly dismissed. According to Agamben, for instance, 
not only are experience and knowledge different, but the former cannot be objectified via 
recourse to analytical reconstructions.292  
For the purposes of our discussion, it will suffice to note that there is still much confusion in 
legal scholarship regarding what distinguishes experience from knowledge, or the nōtum from 
the cognitum. In particular, what is yet to be grasped is that while experience is unique and 
imperfect, knowledge looks for certainty and truth through a logic that prompts 
objectification.293 This is because, like reason, knowledge, as the Humanist Giacomo Zabarella 
understood,294 can only be impersonal. One could argue, along with Husserl, that “the ultimate 
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source of cognition is intuition, an immediate type of cognition… of which perception is the 
paradigm”.295 Similarly, it could be observed, as Nagel does, that “[k]knowledge demands 
some kind of access to a fact on the part of some living subject”.296 Yet even in this case, the 
(experiential, personal, and ultimately imperfect) act of knowing (or perception-based 
phenomenon of knowledge-acquisition) would not coincide with its metaphysical (i.e. 
transcendental and objective) end-result – knowledge itself. The cognising subject is, in other 
words, merely an ontic container of a metaphysical end-result of a process of ontological 
abstraction. This is why, commenting on Francis Bacon, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
stated that “[k]nowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles”.297 The confusion over what 
distinguishes experience from knowledge is, however, understandable as it has to do with, 
among other things, the legacy of Aristotle’s treatment of the subject and subordination of 
experience to knowledge;298 the Humanist desire to combine the universal with the particular 
as well as to explain the orderliness of nature through conceptualism and empiricism;299 and 
the role that the word ‘experience’, as synonymous with ‘experiment’, played in the 
foundational event of modern knowledge and processes of world-disposition (Weltbild) – the 
Scientific Revolution.300  
That knowledge has no limits does not mean, of course, that concepts are flawless. Recent 
debates over how to efficiently conceptualise law and regulatory dynamics are testament to 
this. As the sheer volume of recent works that feature the terms ‘rethinking’, ‘revisiting’, ‘re-
examining’, and the like indicates, no categorisation seems to be capable of obtaining 
unanimous consensus: all conceptualisations are either too thin or too thick, either too loose or 
too rigid. Legal theorists are well aware of this. Yet, one could assert, an incremental approach 
to theorising (i.e. theorising as setting forth constructive conceptual explanations concerned 
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not only with necessary, but also contingent features and relations of law) might solve the 
problem.301 It is difficult to see, however, how this approach would be able to avoid mental 
representations’ inevitable exclusionary dynamics. Referring to the current “politics of 
conceptualisation”, Hans Lindahl has recently noted that “[r]epresentation discloses something 
as this, rather than as that, which entails that it is not possible to include without excluding 
when conceptualising a range of phenomena as law”.302 Similarly, in an article which aims at 
explaining why “[c]onceptual analysis is desirable and necessary in jurisprudence because 
terms (‘law’) have senses that mediate between the terms and their referents (law)”,303 
Aleandro Zanghellini could not but concede that “[t]here is more to law and the legal world 
than what conceptual analysis can reveal”.304 The much-discussed notions of sovereignty and 
authority, two-key concepts in current pluralist discourse, are a good example: as the volume 
of scholarship indicates, an ultimate and all-encompassing framework of intelligibility cannot 
be construed.305 The same may be said with respect to the challenges that legal reasoning and 
jurisprudential inquiry are currently facing beyond state-based models.306  
Perhaps the time is ripe to say that legal scholars’ analytical struggle is primarily due to the 
belief that experiences can be known as if they were entities and rapports accessible through 
systematic inquiry. Or to put it differently, that experience (phenomenologically, its meaning) 
can be accessed only through a form of thought that is both structured and structuring along 
reason’s constructivist properties. This is, perhaps, what Herbert Marcuse meant when he wrote 
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that “the representation of society in the formation of concepts is tantamount to an academic 
condiment of experience, a restriction of meaning”.307  
But if experiences are, following Susan Blackmore (but some commentators might prefer 
Gorgias308), “ineffable”309 and cannot be analytically decoded and arranged but only shared 
(i.e. felt and sensed) because of their “inner historicity”,310 and if normative (including legal) 
plurality is a situational fact,311 how can we make sense of the latter without recurring to 
reason’s structuralism and cognition’s objectifying dynamics? And how can this be done in an 
age, such as ours, of “legal hybrids”?312 That is, in an age that appears to be characterised by 
the incessant pluralisation and dispersion of regulatory sources and dynamics at the macro-, 
meso-, and micro-levels that challenge established normative categories of ‘identity’ and 
‘difference’ and call for a reconsideration and repositioning of ‘the sense of the world’?313 Or 
as Cotterrell put it, how can we “navigate normatively in a realm consisting not only of 
inconsistent regulatory regimes but also of regimes founded on differing, sometimes 
incompatible principles of authority and legitimacy”?314 Is it possible, in the midst of incessant 
and mutually reinforcing “normative disorders”,315 to convey the existential meaning of 
identities without any epistemic aspiration while at the same time avoiding the peril of 
rendering the act of comparison a “fishing expedition” generating only a “meaningless 
togetherness”,316 as Sartori calls it? A possible answer is introduced in the next Section.  
 
Factical Coherence without Formal Correctness 
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The argument pursued in this article is that plurality is a matter of factical experience rather 
than reason and knowledge, and thus, analytical reconstructions. Hence, for jurisprudence to 
be fully pluralist, it needs to abandon the epistemic search for truth and correctness. Neither 
reason’s metaphysical constructivism nor knowledge (a metaphysical end-result of processes 
of ontological abstraction) can be of assistance in accommodating plurality’s ontological 
irreducibility. As discussed, reason’s and knowledge’s transcendental character embraces 
reality only to overcome it. Rather, appreciating the nature and meaning of identity and the 
alterity that defines it requires experiencing the facticity of the other as other (i.e. what it 
phenomenologically means for the other to actualise herself in her ipseity). As in other fields, 
factical thinking is the gateway to pluralist thinking within (comparative) legal discourse too.  
The above considerations should make it clear that the type of phenomenological thinking 
advocated here is not the one praised by Husserl (and followers), with its cognitivist focus on 
the correctness of thinking. Yet, and crucially, it not that of Heidegger, either. Inspired by 
Benjamin’s relational understanding of plurality, the thinking this article calls for does not fall 
pray to the ontic-ontological (or particulars-universals) dilemma. Nor it tries to extract 
universal truths from specific instances of being. It is, in other words, a mode of thinking that 
does not infer the ontological from the ontic. To operationalise this type of thinking will, 
however, require some time as it challenges the very way Western metaphysics (and thus, 
thinking more generally) has approached and conceived of reality. 
To show this, one could quote Massimo Cacciari’s recent analysis of the subject.317 While 
discussing Aristotle’s treatment of particulars and universals (primary and secondary 
substances), Cacciari has noted that “the interrogative of what a being [ente] is defines 
metaphysics and with it, the entire West”.318 Now – and this is the crucial point – because (i) 
thinking (logos) is first and foremost légein, that is, “connections and conjunctions”;319 and (ii) 
as Fine aptly put it, “universals are all dependent on particulars, by being either said of or in 
them”, 320 asking what a being (a table or a friend, to use the same example as before) is, means, 
in Western thinking, asking the two specific questions we analysed earlier on. As set out, both 
lines of questioning are inherently philosophical, having philosophy originated as an exercise 
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aimed at solving the ontological chasm which, at the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides, was 
making it impossible for language to refer to the world. Further, they are inevitably 
phenomenological and ontological, involving, as they do, an inquiry into the factical experience 
of the nature and meaning of identity. 
Legal discourse too has explored these interrogatives. Two fundamental inquiries in legal 
theory and philosophy are, first, what renders law truly such, i.e. as opposed to other regulatory 
entities; and secondly, how can a distinction between the being of law (ontological) from the 
law (ontic) be formulated. Importantly, as is the case with philosophers, legal scholars too seem 
to have been holding that an encounter with something (ontic) merely offers a glimpse of the 
thing’s ontological substance and thus it does not exhaust it. Andrew Halpin believes, for 
instance, that “[w]e do not in having an experience of something experience the totality of that 
thing”.321 A similar argument can be found in Oren-Ben Dor’s call for a Heideggerian, 
ethically-charged322 understanding of the being of law: “[a]lthough the essence of law is lurking 
in any ontic manifestation of it, it could not be further than this manifestation”.323 What Ben-
Dor emphasises is but an expression of what Louis E. Wolcher calls Western thought’s 
obsession with “unity and truth”,324 that is to say, the ordering drive that informs Western 
thinking and makes the latter infer universal truths from singular, factical experiences.325 “The 
impulse to unify and verify”, Wolcher observes, “is especially strong in matters of law and 
justice, where the task of ascertaining and judging what happened on the basis of some idea of 
what ought to have happened seems unavoidable”.326 Few would disagree.  
From this it follows that Glenn’s reflections on binary and non-binary thinking bring within 
legal discourse the central and pervasive themes around which phenomenological-ontological 
inquiry has been developing since Husserl. The fact that Glenn places Plato and Aristotle at the 
centre of his criticism of binary-exclusionary thinking and logic is all the more interesting as it 
indirectly points at what Marcuse called classical logic’s “ontological prejudice”327 – that is to 
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say, the belief that “the structure of the judgement (proposition) refers to a divided reality”.328 
Marcuse continues: 
The discourse moves between the experience of Being and non-Being, essence and 
fact, generation and corruption, potentiality and actuality. The Aristotelian 
Organon abstracts from this unity of opposites the general forms of propositions 
and of their (correct or incorrect) connections; still decisive parts of this formal 
logic remain committed to Aristotelian metaphysics. Prior to this formalization, the 
experience of the divided world finds its logic in the Platonic dialectic.329 
Heidegger too assigned to Plato’s mathematical vision of nature330 and Aristotle’s 
scientification and technologisation of experience331 a key-role in the creation of a profound 
misunderstanding regarding what makes up reality. Plato and Aristotle did so, Heidegger 
maintained, by introducing what he called the ‘ontological difference’ between Being and 
beings. Since its inception, this difference has influenced the whole development of 
phenomenology, or analytical method of philosophy conceived as ontology.332 The term 
‘Being’333 is used by Heidegger to name the letting be of beings as they are in nature, i.e. 
without the metaphysical ‘pro-vocation’ (Heraus-fordern) of the res cogitans.334 As such, it is 
different from its ontic manifestations or ‘beings’, such as a chair, a window, a book, etc. In 
developing his critique against the technologisation335 of the spirit that, he believed, has been 
affecting Western thinking since Plato and Aristotle’s substitution of (factical) logos with 
(metaphysical) logic,336 Heidegger also pointed his finger against modern technology which, 
he thought, should be kept apart from its ancient counterpart. The latter is a genuine mode of 
revealing what exists, or “bringing-forth in the sense of poiēsis”,337 whereas modern 
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technology is an illusory machination (Machenshaft) as “representational calculation”.338 
Hence machination “does not name a kind of human conduct but a mode of the essential 
occurrence of being”.339 It is “the sovereignty of making and of the realm of what is made”,340 
which leads to the “distorted essence of the beingness of beings”.341 Machination is whatever 
hinges on reason’s metaphysical constructivism and knowledge’s working logic, including 
theoretical inquires: machination is the desire for “calculable explainability, whereby 
everything draws equally close together to everything else and become completely foreign to 
itself”.342 The result is a world in which relationality is voided of its content; a world, that is, 
in which life becomes a “relation of unreletenedness”.343 “Freedom”, Heidegger will later 
specify, “rests in being able to let, not in ordering and dominating”.344 Arguably, Heidegger 
accounted for this most clearly in his early philosophy of factical life, where he showed that 
“[t]here are others in the everyday with-world who are… encountered in their 
meaningfulness”.345 
In light of the foregoing considerations, and as anticipated earlier, the factical form of thinking 
advocated here departs from the cognitivist focus on the correctness of thinking that 
characterises Husserlian phenomenology, and embraces Heidegger’s factical hermeneutics (or 
early philosophy). Yet, crucially, it also moves away from Heidegger’s phenomenology, and 
specifically (i) his critique of lived experience and culture – whose dynamics, Heidegger hold, 
are ultimately metaphysical346; and the (ii) universal/particulars, or Being/being, antithesis. A 
starting point for doing this would be to reflect on why meaning (the key normative notion in 
issues of identity and difference) cannot but be thematic (pluralist jurisprudents would say 
contextual). As it was seen, this has already been set out by Crowell, according to whom 
phenomenological encounters are first and foremost experience-based semantic events, rather 
than cognitivist elaborations aimed at gaining knowledge of the world.347 This explains one of 
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the quotes that open this article. Crowell’s view adapts well to pluralism’s facticity and our 
ability to experience it to the extent that it encourages a reflection on the ways the living subject 
encounters (i.e. factically experiences) the existential meaning of the other as other than 
herself. Yet Crowell leaves aside Heidegger’s factical philosophy which, if combined with 
Benjamin’s argument on plurality’s ontological effectiveness, might assist legal scholars in 
actualising pluralist thinking. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If we are, as Glenn asks us to do, to be sensitive to legal plurality and assign it a predominant 
place in (comparative) legal studies, then we need to embark upon an experiential thinking that 
prioritises substance over form, or factical coherence over formal correctness. This requires an 
other-regarding and meaning-revealing act of lived experience (Erlebnis) capable of 
appreciating that regulatory dynamics are relational encounters. Neither logical pluralism, nor 
analogical processes of analysis/argumentation, nor conceptual representations can be of 
assistance in this enterprise. This is because the coherence sought here is not that offered by 
rational and cognitivist forms of validation.348   
This does not mean, however, that irrationalism is the answer. As Heidegger demonstrated (but 
one could, with due caution, also refer to Franz Kafka), irrationalism only “plays the games of 
rationalism more dangerously[,] more covertly, and in a manner less vulnerable to 
interference”.349 It does not mean denying the ordering dynamics of any act of perception.350 
Rather, it means leaving the plane of socio-cultural scientific object construction and moving 
to one that has no cognitivist (i.e. structuring) purpose. It means, in other words, opting for a 
“nonmetaphysical, non-trascendental understanding of the human being, one that proceeds 
directly from life itself”.351 As discussed, in phenomenological terms, this requires moving 
beyond Husserlian (specifically, its focus on the cognitivist correctness of thinking) and 
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Heideggerian (specifically, its universal/particulars, or Being/being, mind-set and 
consequential antagonism towards lived experience) phenomenology. 
If, as Samuel has made clear, legal reasoning as a rational and epistemic activity is not 
concerned with the real world, with its actual phenomena, but with their analytical 
reconstructions, then it would not be enough for comparative law’s “epistemic commitments” 
to be re-conceived “reflexively and critically”, as Legrand says.352 Rather, the appreciation of 
plurality’s ontological irreducibility requires a non-epistemic preoccupation, through an act of 
lived experience, with the facticity of beings as phenomena. 
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